

Why Do Third Parties Coordinate in Armed Conflicts and Peace Processes: Exploring the Conditions for Third-Party Coordination in Nepal and the Philippines

(Please do not site this paper without prior consent from the author)

Prakash Bhattarai
PhD Candidate
National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
University of Otago, New Zealand
Email- prakash.bhattarai@gmail.com

Abstract

A growing field within mediation research explores issues of multiparty intervention and third-party coordination in peace processes. However, it largely lacks an in-depth explanation of factors that play a dominant role in the occurrence of third-party coordination. Drawing on cases of third-party intervention practices of the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines, this research identifies that the occurrence of coordination requires the readiness of both supply (third parties) and demand (conflicting parties) sides. Context, Policy, and Motive are three major factors which makes third parties ready to coordinate. This research further finds that the occurrence of third-party coordination changes in different phases of conflict. Most coordination takes place during the escalation phase, and less coordination occurs in the political normalization phase. Likewise, issues of international concern such as human rights and the homogeneity of interveners are other core elements that often contribute to third-party coordination.

1. Introduction

Empirical research shows that about half of mediation efforts around the world, particularly since the mid-1990s, have included more than one third party (Beber 2010, Lindgren, Wallensteen, and Grusell 2010). This trend in the increasing number of third-parties indicates a profound policy interests in conflict resolution¹ efforts across the globe (Crocker 2011, Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001, Crocker, Aall, and Hampson 1999, Kriesberg 1996a, Svensson 2011, Bercovitch and Jackson 2009, Paris 2009). With the rise in the number of third parties, the issue of multiparty intervention² and third-party³ coordination has grown in importance. Thus, the existing literature ably describes the potential of third-party coordination⁴ to positively contribute to conflict resolution, and the lack of coordination may lead towards intervention failure. The literature also pinpoints that coordination is not happening on a regular basis, mainly because of distinct policy and strategic interests of third parties.

Despite highlighting some of the important aspects of third-party coordination, the current literature tends to be very focused on how and when third-party should coordinate, the advantages and disadvantages of coordination, and challenges associated with coordination.

¹ For the purpose of this research, conflict resolution is defined from the broader as well as the narrower perspectives. In a narrow picture, conflict resolution means, conflicting parties' formal agreement to stop war and continue negotiation until they signed a peace agreement, whereas in a broader picture, it includes all activities that should be carried out from the pre-agreement to post-agreement phases until a sustainable peace (defined by the peace agreement) has not been achieved.

² For the purpose of this research, I define a multiparty intervention as the involvement of a heterogeneous group of third-parties in conflict resolution processes with various roles, expertise, resources, and interests. In a multiparty intervention, third-parties can be either invited in by the conflicting parties to provide support to the peace process, or self-interested in intervening to advance their own institutional interests. Furthermore, multiparty intervention can also be a form of intervention taken by third parties as a group with formal or informal association in different intervention structures; or it could be isolated action taken by many third-parties within a particular conflict system.

³ For the purpose of this research, third-party interveners include nation states, regional and global powers, the UN and its specialized agencies, multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies, international peacebuilding organizations, local civil society organizations, and prominent individuals who are engaged in various phases of armed conflicts and peace processes with various roles such as political interveners, social interveners, and humanitarian and development interveners. Third-parties' involvement can be in both official and unofficial capacities; it can be through a formalized intervention mechanism facilitated and mandated by the conflicting parties, or through informal involvements.

⁴ Third-party coordination is an environment and process in which a range of third-parties, regardless of their origin, power status and role, make different attempts to work together in different stages of conflict. The aim of third-party coordination is to contribute to the reduction of violence in its initial stages, and ultimately to contribute to the settlement of a particular conflict. Such coordination can be between local and external third parties, among local third parties, and among external third parties. It can also be between two or more official entities, two or more unofficial entities, or a combination of official and unofficial third-parties.

However, issues related to the conditions for third-party coordination are not adequately discussed. Thus, this paper argues that an in-depth understanding of the conditions for third-party coordination is particularly salient, because it provides insights into some of the root causes of third-party coordination problems. Better understanding of this topic also helps us to understand the underlying factors that motivate (or demotivate) third parties to coordinate, and also to design effective third-party coordination strategies that a conflict-affected country requires. The current literature on this issue only provides general explanations, such as how the different institutional and policy interests of third parties impede coordination, and how the convergence of such interests contributes to coordination. The existing literature does not however help us to fully understand some of the core contextual, procedural, and motives factors behind the occurrence (or the lack) of third-party coordination. In order to fill this gap in analysis, this paper broadens our understanding on this issue with empirically identified a set of conditions for third-party coordination in armed conflicts and peace processes.

This paper aims to make some policy contributions to the field of international conflict resolution. Third-party coordination has become an important topic of discussion among policymakers, both in the national and international arenas. However, policymakers often find difficult to address coordination problems because of a lack of contextual research-based information and analysis on this topic. It is against this backdrop that a better understanding of the conditions for third-party coordination could be extremely valuable information for addressing coordination problems in the best possible manner.

This paper also has potential to contribute empirically in the area of third-party intervention research. The Maoist armed conflict in Nepal and the Moro conflict in the Philippines are relatively understudied conflicts from the perspective of third-party intervention, and not studied at all from the perspective of third-party coordination. In this regard, selected cases have their genuine empirical significance to contribute to the existing literature.

This paper is organized in the following manner. In the following section, I provide an overview of existing literature on third-party coordination. I then discuss about the cases selected to this study and the methodology implied in the research. I then simultaneously discuss and analyze the third-party coordination practices observed within the selected cases. Later on, I conduct a synchronized analysis of both cases to find similarities and differences in the occurrence of third-

party coordination. In the final section, I summarize the research findings and explain their policy significance.

2. Theoretical Explanation of Conditions for Third-Party Coordination

The existing literature primarily highlights third-party coordination as one of the most problematic but also important aspect of conflict intervention. For example, previous research gave greater attention to issues such as the advantages and disadvantages of third-party coordination (See Beber 2010, Boehmelt 2010, Iji and Fuchinoue 2009, Frazier and Dixon 2006, Nan and Strimling 2006, Strimling 2006, Sisk 2002, Kriesberg 1996a). Scholars have also described different forms of third-party coordination such as sequential and simultaneous, or complementary and contributory (Öberg, Möller, and Wallenstein 2009, Kriesberg 1996b, Fisher 2006, Strimling 2006, Nan 2003). Some discussions are focused on issues surrounding the approaches and strategies for third-party coordination (See Crocker et al. 2002, Kriesberg 1996, Rubin 1992, and Susskind & Babbitt 1992). In the existing literature, there is also extensive discussion on the coordination of official and unofficial intervention efforts (See Kraft 2000, Böhmelt 2010, Gurkaynak 2007, Chataway 1998, Chigas 1997, Fisher 2006, Kriesberg 1991). Importantly, in the existing literature, there is a fair amount of discussion about how coordination should take place in order to make intervention processes effective (See Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2002, Jackson 2005, Jones 2001, Iji 2005, Kriesberg 1996a, Paris 2009, Strimling 2006, Zartman 2004).

One key weakness of previous research is that it pays greater attention to the lack of coordination in multiparty intervention processes. A superficial understanding of the conflict context, lack of diplomatic unity, lack of coherent intervention approaches and strategies, intervening roles of larger agencies and powerful nation states, and realpolitik views prevalent among organizations are highlighted as some of the contributing factors to the lack of third-party coordination (Ricigliano 2003, Crocker, Aall, and Hampson 1999, Kriesberg 1996a, Iji 2001, Iji and Fuchinoue 2009, Griffiths and Whitfield 2010). On the other hand, there is very little discussion in the literature on the conditions for third-party coordination. A general argument is that coordination among third parties is largely coincidental in armed conflicts and has often taken place on the basis of the mutual policy interests of third parties or ‘a broad coincidence of interests and commitments’ within a particular conflict (Iji and Fuchinoue 2009). Similarly, a

convergence of institutional interests and a clear division of labor between official and nonofficial intervention processes, contributed to bring a diverse array of interveners together (Iji 2005). This limited interpretation motivated me to further identify the conditions under which third-parties coordinate in armed conflicts and peace processes.

3. The Cases

This paper critically evaluates third-party coordination practices within the Maoist armed conflict in Nepal and the Moro conflict in the Philippines.

An armed conflict erupted in Nepal in February 1996. The Communist Party of Nepal, Maoist (CPN, Maoist)⁵ instigated an armed struggle by undertaking several violent attacks on police posts and government offices in some districts of Mid-Western Nepal. The Maoists articulated three broad objectives of their armed resistance: to wipe out the ‘capitalist class and the state system’ that had traditionally existed; to abolish the Monarchy⁶ that protected and promoted feudalism; and to establish a democratic republic ruled by the people (Mahat 2005). This conflict lasted for 10 years and formally ended after the government and the Maoists signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in November 2006.

Due to the presence of multiplicity of interveners, the Maoist armed conflict is a highly relevant case to assess the coordination dynamics of third parties. Third parties, including global and regional powers like the US, India, China, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), other nation states mainly the Scandinavian countries, donor agencies, local and international peacebuilding Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and individual mediators have all been active in Nepal in all phases of the conflict but with different capacities. Despite all these engagements, questions about how they coordinated and complemented each other’s intervention efforts have yet to be satisfyingly answered. This case study therefore fills this gap to some extent.

The Moro conflict in the Philippines is another relevant case for this research. The Moro conflict comprises two conflicts concentrated in Mindanao, the southern part of the Philippines: conflict

⁵ Although they are now popularly known as UCPN (Maoist), I have here described them simply Maoists.

⁶ There was an active Monarchy rule in Nepal until the 1990s. After the success of the People’s Movement in 1990, the then King was ready to share power with parliamentary political parties and remain as constitutional Monarch. However, the King still held some powers, such as Chief of Command of the then Royal Nepal Army.

between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the conflict between the GPH and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Within the two and half decades of sporadic war between the GPH and the MNLF rebels, there were several negotiation efforts. The key outcome of those negotiations was the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).⁷ However, the agreement could not be put into effect, and it dragged the MNLF back to on and off war until 1995. With great deal of third-party mediation and other intervention strategies, both the Manila government and the MNLF leaders agreed to revisit the Tripoli Agreement and signed a new deal in 1996.

However, the MILF, a splinter group from the mainstream MNLF, was dissatisfied with the 1996 peace agreement and the moderate stance taken by the MNLF regarding the future of the Muslim population living in Mindanao. Particularly, the MILF felt that the provision of Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was too limited compared with their original demand to reclaim the Bangsamoro homeland. Thus, MILF entered into a separate but related armed resistance against the Manila government in early 1997. This armed struggle (with some breakdown in fighting in between that period) continued for almost 13 years. The last ceasefire was in November 2009, and has been the longest one yet, allowing the production of a Framework Agreement in October 2012 and eventually signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in March 2014.

The multiplicity of third-party interveners can be observed in both of the Moro conflicts. In the GPH-MNLF conflict, the OIC and its member countries, particularly Indonesia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Brunei, served as the third-party interveners. So far in the case of the GPH-MILF peace process, a significant number of local and external third-parties have been involved in both a formal and informal capacity. For example, Malaysia was involved as a facilitator of the high-level negotiation process, while four nation states, namely, Japan, the UK, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia and four international organizations, namely, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD), the Asia Foundation, Conciliation Resources, and Muhamaddiyah are involved as the members of the International Contact Group (ICG) to provide support to the high-level

⁷ OIC has changed its name since 2005. Now it is known as Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

negotiations. There is another formal intervention structure called the International Monitoring Team (IMT) which mainly works at the local level to monitor different aspects of the peace process, particularly, the civilian protection, human rights protection, socio-economic progress, rehabilitation, and security. Some of the IMT members include Malaysia, Japan, Indonesia, Norway, and the EU. Other members of the IMT include Nonviolent Peace Force, Mindanao People Caucus, and Mindanao Human Rights Action Centre. In addition, significant numbers of civil society organizations and networks of NGOs are involved as local third-party actors. This plethora of actors makes it a fascinating case study for examining the dynamics of third-party coordination. However, this conflict has arguably not yet been comprehensively studied in this respect.

4. Research Approach

I have adopted a multiple case-study method, which is structured with the concurrent observation of cases for understanding the dynamics of third-party coordination in two different conflict settings. This study relies primarily on primary data collected from the field. Public documents, such as articles, reports, and news archives that highlight the third-party relationships and power dynamics are not found in adequate quantity. Thus, this paper is mostly based on the subjective and objective analysis of in-depth interviews with key informants in each case. Available and relevant secondary sources of information are also utilized.

Using a semi-structured questionnaire approach, primary data was collected during three months of field research in Kathmandu, Nepal, from December 2011 to February 2012, and two months of field research in Manila and Mindanao, the Philippines from July-August 2012. Altogether 83 face-to-face interviews were conducted in the field: 40 of them were in Nepal and 43 in the Philippines. Interviewees were drawn from political party leaders, peace panel members, peace dialogue facilitators, representatives of diplomatic missions, UN officials, representatives of donor agencies, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and NGOs who are serving or have served as third-party interveners. Not all relevant third parties have been interviewed due to their unavailability during the period of field research, as well as their unwillingness to share information. Thus, this study only captures the voices of those who were available and accessible during the field research period.

5. Findings

This research provides rather ambiguous and equivocal results regarding the occurrence of third-party coordination, largely because it is different from one conflict context to another and from one conflict stage to another. In some cases, third-party coordination practices are very different even within the same phase of the conflict. In other words, the occurrence of third-party coordination is highly contingent. However, the research does provide some indicators of how and why coordination takes place among third parties. Some findings also speak to the applicability of previous research findings, whereas other results generate new perspectives on third-party coordination.

5.1 Coordination as a Self-Interested Event

This research has identified that third-party coordination is frequently a self-interested activity. Coordination occurs largely when third parties feel that it is primarily in their interests and only secondarily for the benefit of the conflict-affected country. For example, external interveners who were the long-time supporters of development initiatives in Nepal experienced a number of challenges during the time of conflict in implementing their development programs. Pre-approval from the Maoist rebels before the implementation of any programs, payment of donations or monthly levies by local and international NGO staff, and other kind of support, either in cash or in kind, were prevalent during the time of conflict (Frieden 2012). In this context, third parties began coordinating. One of such endeavor was an agreement on Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs) in October 2003 by a group of development interveners, with the exception of the US, India, and China. According to Frieden, the BOGs were intended “ [t]o defend the development space against the pretensions of the insurgents and the interference of the security forces, which were trying to limit the free movement and open communication of development workers” (Frieden 2012, p. 103). It also “allowed development agencies to coordinate common response to challenges and abuse by the parties in conflict” (Frieden 2012, p. 103). By contrast, under normal circumstances, they did not actively coordinate, but rather found competed for resources, dominance, and recognition.

5.2 Coordination as a Mission-Driven Event

Third-party coordination is also largely a mission-driven event. It tends to occur primarily to address a particular event or incident or to achieve a particular outcome, such as the reduction of violence, pressuring the conflicting parties to sign a peace agreement, or show greater respect for

human rights. For example, in Nepal, there was no evident third-party coordination in the first five years of the conflict, between 1996 and early 2001. In this early phase, coordination was not prioritized by external third parties, as the low severity of conflict during this period did not have an adverse impact on their routine developmental efforts. A lack of common understanding among interveners about possible solutions to the conflict also impeded their coordination. Some interveners were in favor of mainstreaming the Maoists through peaceful negotiations, whereas others were in favor of pursuing military victory (Kievelitz and Polzer 2002).

However, with the escalation of violence after November 2001, coordination among third parties began to increase. Between the periods of high escalation of violence and until the signing of the peace accord in November 2006, there were only specific issues of concern for third parties, including the reduction of violence, stopping human rights abuses, pushing the conflicting parties to sign a formal peace deal, and reinstating democracy (Interviews 2012). In other words, third parties had a clear idea of the areas where they could or should intervene. Third parties also had a mostly similar analysis and understanding of the conflict context, as well as similar views on the possible resolution of the conflict. For example, a gradual consensus emerged that the international community would not support the violent takeover of state power by the Maoists, nor military victory over the Maoists by the government side (Whitfield 2012). Likewise, powerful third parties, such as India, the US, and the UK, who were providing military assistance to the government until early 2005, halted assistance after the absolute Royal takeover of power in February 2005 (Interview 2012). Likewise, local third parties, particularly NGOs, CSOs, and human rights groups, were raising their voice for a peaceful solution of the conflict. There was already a group of Western European countries advocating for a peaceful solution. In this way, the political environment of Nepal from early 2005 until early 2006 created a consensus among the interveners that Nepal required a negotiated and peaceful end to the conflict, instead of a military solution.

There is no guarantee that the third parties will opt to continue coordinating after addressing a particular issue. Several respondents in Nepal suggested that there have been a number of coordination problems in the post-agreement period. An important reason for this is in the post-agreement period, many third parties had distinct opinions and views of the political context, particularly their views of the rebel group. This political atmosphere eventually reduced the

possibility of third-party coordination. Consequently, differences in opinions and ideas regarding the modality of the peace process prevented them from coordinating with each other, as some actors advocated a fast-track solution, whereas others favored a sustainable but slow-track solution (Interview 2012). These kinds of divisions in opinion among interveners were the results of many different factors, including a lack of shared understanding of the conflict context, and shifting priorities in a changing political environment. One important example of this is related to the welcoming of the UN Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and its later termination. In 2007, most third parties, including India, welcomed UNMIN's presence in Nepal to support the post-war peace initiatives, mainly, the monitoring of the ceasefire, the CA election, and the management of arms and armies. However, in 2010-2011, no unified voice was heard among external third parties on extending UNMIN's presence in Nepal. For instance, the "United Kingdom was in favor of technical rollover by a month, while China argued on acting upon the request of Nepal. EU, led by the United Kingdom, wanted to send a strong signal to Nepal that the failure of the local actors couldn't be passed on to the world body" (Saurabh 2010). Many respondents also expressed the belief that India was against the keeping of UNMIN for an extended period, and then pressured the Nepalese government to terminate its mandate. India was reluctant to keep the UN mission in Nepal, as it wanted to obtain maximum credit for its support for Nepal's peace process, and was therefore not keen to share credit with the UN and other interveners.

Consequently, there was a distinct lack of coordination among third parties regarding the implementation of several provisions of the peace agreement. The lack of a consolidated voice among third parties on the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the modality of the federal state, and uncoordinated support and advice during the constitution writing process are some examples of this. There are a number of reasons for the lack of third-party coordination in the post-agreement period. First and foremost, the post-agreement environment was an opportunity for many third parties to analyze the political context from the view point of their own interests, and to predict future scenarios in a broader perspective. Whereas during the conflict, they had to analyze the situation from a narrower perspective, such as how to deal with armed violence and how to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiation table (Interview 2012). Second, the approachability of third parties to both high ranking political party leaders and the rebel leaders also contributed significantly to their lack of coordination.

Easy access to high-ranking leaders of the conflicting parties in the post-agreement period gave third parties the opportunity to express their concerns and interests directly to the key stakeholders of the peace process. This was not the case during the period of violent conflict.

Similar to Nepal, the Philippines case also shows that the political turmoil and pressure of violence contributed to the occurrence of third-party coordination. The evidence suggests that third-party coordination was not a priority in the conflict intervention during the beginning phase (1997-2000) of the GPH-MILF conflict. This is partly because the situation was not complicated in terms of the intensity and impact of the armed conflict. Another characteristic of this early phase of conflict was the absence of a diverse range of third-party interveners. Those involved at this stage were a small number of local third parties. However, third parties began to come together after a sharp escalation in the fighting between the government and the MILF. For example, after the declaration of all-out war in 2000 by then-president Estrada, and a major clash between the GPH and MILF in 2003, civil society organizations from Mindanao, as well as Manila came together to form a number of peace advocacy networks. In other words, number of third parties and intervention structures increased following each major outbreak of war. The formation of the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) and Mindanao Peacemakers (MPW) between 2000 and 2003 are some examples of these networks (Interview 2012). Similarly, the IMT was initially formed in 2005 after major violence in 2003-2004. It was established as a collective intervention mechanism for the monitoring of the ceasefire at ground level. The eruption of violence in late 2008 after the parties failed to sign the MOA-AD was another turning point for advancing third-party coordination, as it led to the establishment of the ICG in 2009, the CPC in 2010, and the return of the IMT in early 2010. The conflicting parties realized that structures like the ICG and the IMT could be helpful for minimizing violence and providing support for the negotiation process. Thus, it can be argued that third-party coordination, whether in the form of formalized structures like the ICG and IMT, or other more informal structures, like the networks formed by civil society groups, are generated as a product of intensified violence.

There are other cases which demonstrate the coordinated efforts of third parties during crises and intense levels of violence. For example, Manila-based diplomatic missions issued joint press statements on several occasions expressing their concern about the fighting and the humanitarian

crisis in Mindanao. Similarly, coordinated third-party intervention was also found during the negotiation stalemate phase of the GPH-MILF conflict through lobbying and putting pressure on the conflicting parties.

However, interveners did not coordinate with the same enthusiasm, when there is no or low intensity of violence to create a sense of urgency. One of the respondents said, “During the crisis, everyone is doing well. After the crisis, people will no longer converge and also resort to blaming, instead of talking and reflecting” (Interview 2012). Thus, it can be argued that third-party coordination is often a need-based activity, rather than a usual practice that always takes place in conflict resolution processes. Contextual factors such as the complex political environment drives third parties to take coordinated actions, and such coordination are often directed towards ensuring the contented presence of third parties in conflict environment. In this sense, coordination in both cases is found to be a strategic decision by the third parties, rather than what Crocker et al. (2001) have argued it as an important strategy to gain necessary ‘political will’ and ‘muscle’ to bring conflicting parties to the negotiation table.

5.3 Cost Benefit Analysis and Third-Party Coordination

A cost benefit analysis is found to be a crucial factor in promoting third-party coordination during the time of intense political crisis in Nepal. Incentives, in the form of strategic success and the promotion of core values are two important issues behind third-party coordination. Third parties have been clustered into five broad categories in order to analyze their interests and incentives in Nepal’s peace process.

Local third parties belong to the first category. Their incentive was to ensure a democratic and violence free society. Democratic culture flourished in Nepal after the people’s movement of the 1990s and local third parties were accustomed to that environment. However, the prevalence of violence and the King’s control over the democratic government threatened this situation. Thus, coordination among themselves and with other third parties was essential to wage a peaceful and democratic movement to defend their newly emerged identity as a member of a democratic society (Interviews 2012).

India belongs to the second category of third-party. The incentive behind its engagement was related to its domestic security and strategic concerns. Because of its open border with Nepal,

political instability and insecurity in Nepal could pose a security threat. Extensive insecurity in Nepal could also give other regional and global powers, such as China and the US, an opportunity to interfere, which could weaken India's political influence over Nepal (Bhattarai 2005). Thus, India was interested in blocking the interference of other interveners, including the UN, the US, China and the European countries. Likewise, the expansion of the Indian Maoist movement posed an internal security threat to India. It was believed that there was a possible connection between the Maoist groups of Nepal and India. In this context, it was critical for India to disengage the Nepali Maoists from armed violence and involve them in mainstream politics (Interviews 2012). This action could have a ripple effect on India.

EU members belong to the third category of third parties. They had no visible strategic interests in Nepal; however, their incentives seem to have been value driven. Rocketing violence and the King's takeover was gradually destroying the democratic culture and human rights violations were increasing throughout Nepal. This situation attacked their core values, as EU members had been advocating and supporting human rights and democracy since 1990, the beginning of the era of multi-party democracy in Nepal. The success of the peace process would therefore protect and promote these core values (Interviews 2012).

The US belongs to the fourth category of third parties. Its incentive for intervening in Nepal's conflict was to mitigate the emergence of a communist movement. More importantly, the Maoists were labeled a terrorist group by the US government, thus their intervention was linked with the War on Terror (Bhattarai 2005). Moreover, being a global advocate of democracy, they were also opposed to the King's move to seize political power.

Other third parties, such as the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and the UK, belong to the final category. They are longtime supporters of Nepal's development process and wanted to secure their presence in Nepal into the future. The prevalence of violence and autocracy would therefore be a policy failure of their development and cooperation efforts. They also had human rights and democracy concerns (Interview 2012). From this perspective, all third parties found that ending the conflict in Nepal would benefit them in one way or another. Although each had distinct policy interests behind their support for ending the conflict, coordination among them was an important and time-relevant priority for fulfilling their individual interests.

5.4 Intervention Structure and Third-Party Coordination

Coordination can also occur when the conflicting parties come up with formalized intervention structures for managing third-party intervention efforts. This research demonstrates that coordination through certain intervention structures has found to be a useful strategy in the Philippines. However, just forming an intervention structure does not guarantee that effective coordination takes place; how those intervention structures are constructed also matters in a great deal. In the Philippines, the government and the rebels carefully selected the members of the ICG and the IMT. They chose interveners they believed would be most useful in supporting their negotiations. A good balance between state and non-state third parties was also helpful. Most importantly, the lack of active intervention by multiple global and regional powers within the intervention structure was another crucial reason why it worked well. In the existing literature, formation of institutionalized third-party coordination mechanism have been mentioned as one of the useful strategies for conflict resolution and for meaningful interaction between intermediaries (Strimling 2006), and such practices are also seen in different conflict contexts in the name of Contact Group, Group of Friends and so on (Whitfield 2008). However, the uniqueness of the Philippines case is that existing intervention structures are mandated by the conflicting parties and it combines both state and non-state actors into those intervention structures. Thus, it can argued that mandate-based third-party intervention can be an important strategy for the occurrence of coordination even among third parties with heterogeneous characters, as mandate compel them to work collectively by putting their cultural and political differences aside. Mandate-based intervention structures adopted by the conflicting parties can highly contribute to manage the competing goals of third parties and eventually contributing to the occurrence of their coordination in the post-agreement or political normalization phase. Mandate-based intervention structures are particularly salient, because it bounds third parties to intervene in a conflict with a particular approach and in particular areas. However, a state suffering from armed conflict needs to have sufficient political capacity to regulate the involvement of third parties and assign them certain intervention mandates. A good line of communication between the conflicting parties is also crucial for establishing the mandate-based intervention structures, as this would help them to talk openly about whom to accept as third-party for what intervention action. Moreover, the conflicting parties should also realize the necessity of such intervention structures in support the peace process.

5.5 Conflict Related Issues and Third-Party Coordination

Nepal's case demonstrates that some third-party coordination events were based on the third party's convergence of interests; often, they were issue based and observed in both the highly escalated and post-agreement phases of conflict. For example, a number of respondents explained that the issue of human rights brought many third parties together. Whether it was to put pressure on both conflicting parties to stop human rights violations, or to lobby for establishing an OHCHR and UNMIN office in Nepal, most international actors, particularly the Western countries, the UN, and the human rights community, raised a similar voice. The following quotation further supports this interpretation:

During this period, rights defenders in Nepal became increasingly united in their public advocacy against both Maoist and army violence. When the army began to detain large number of people without producing them before the court and to deny or limit access to military detention by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the ICRC, human rights lawyers filed hundreds of habeas corpus petitions in the Supreme Court- at great potential risk (Rawski and Sharma 2012, p. 179).

Local third-parties, namely human rights groups engaged in human rights advocacy, condemned human rights abuses committed by both the Maoists and government security forces. The efforts of local third parties were supported by the Western diplomatic community. Likewise, Western countries lobbied at the UN Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva to nominate a special rapporteur to Nepal to investigate conflict-related human rights abuses. This eventually contributed to the establishment of the OHCHR office in Nepal in 2005.

The third parties mentioned above had set human rights protection as their primary agenda during the period of armed conflict, and it can be argued that their genuine humanitarian interest to safeguard the fundamental rights of the people was a crucial factor behind their coordinated human rights interventions.

Third-party coordination on issues surrounding a UN interagency integration and rehabilitation program of more than 4,000 ex-combatants, who were discharged from the cantonments as disqualified combatants, is another relevant example of issue based third-party coordination in Nepal. This was a major, time consuming, but important task of the peace process. Numerous respondents acknowledged that although the third parties had different views on the modality

and allocation of resources in support of this integration and rehabilitation initiative. Nonetheless, their active participation in the UN-convened meetings and discussions around this issue was one of the best examples of post-agreement coordination. In this case, virtually the entire international community came under one coordination mechanism chaired by UNDP resident coordinator Robert Piper (Interviews 2012). Before the discharge process began, leading officials from different UN agencies including UNMIN, came together to devise a solid plan to push the process along, and coordinated with the government and the Maoists to support the process. There was also an effective division of labor. UNMIN undertook its political negotiations, the UN country team added pressure, and the donors allocated the funding required for the successful completion of the process. The occurrence of coordination in this case was also due to strong leadership and having a lead agency to coordinate the process (Interview 2011).

The above examples demonstrate that urgent issues and/or issues of high interest can motivate third parties to come together and take coordinated action in both the intensive armed phase and political normalization phase of conflict. Issue-based third-party coordination practices have three main characteristics: a) majority of third parties have coordinated on issues of international concerns, such as human rights, because it is an issue of global interest and it provides legitimacy to the rhetoric of many Western countries; b) majority of third parties have coordinated on contentious issues of the peace process, such as integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants in the case of Nepal; and c) many of those issue-based coordination are observed only among homogeneous group of third parties, such as only those who are concerned about human rights and only those who represent the Western countries and shares similar cultural values and political ideologies. I further argue that some issues in armed conflict and the peace process are quite attractive for some third parties, mainly for advancing their policy interests, although partly because of genuine humanitarian reasons. In this regard, third parties who share a similar conflict resolution objective, and shared political analysis of the conflict context, desire to intervene collectively to address those particular issues. They find coordination as an effective intervention strategy for producing a desirable outcome for their mutual benefit, and for the benefit of the conflict-affected country, as well.

5.6 Role of Conflicting Parties and Third-Party Coordination

Another important finding of this research is to identify the role of the conflicting parties in facilitating third-party coordination processes, and this particularly found to be highly relevant in the Philippines case. Existing literature explain that the roles of lead agencies and mutual policy interests and initiatives of third parties are key to the occurrence of third-party coordination (Iji 2005, Iji and Fuchinoue 2009). In contrast to these explanations, this research has found that the roles of conflicting parties are also quite crucial. Conflicting parties, with the formation of mandate-based intervention structures can encourage a diverse range of third parties to work together as a united group, and to make some measurable and meaningful contribution to the success of the peace process. For example, in the Philippines, the conflicting parties' efforts and interests have often been key to bringing a diverse array of third parties together, although civil society initiatives are an exception in this respect. In the GPH-MILF peace process, whether it is the ICG or IMT, have all been formed through the facilitation of the conflicting parties. There are two prominent factors behind the conflicting parties' interests in forming such structured intervention mechanisms. First, the growing intensity of the conflict after the failure of negotiations in 2005 and later in 2008 compelled the government to set-up different intervention structures, in order to create an environment for resuming talks with the MILF. Similarly, the MILF demanded more international guarantees in order to resume talks with the government. Second, the failure of previous single-party intervention efforts inspired both conflicting parties to agree on multiparty intervention structures, where local, as well as international third parties, could support and witness the development of the peace process (Interview 2012).

The ICG and IMT perform their roles as per the Terms of Reference set forth by the conflicting parties and agreed upon by Malaysia, the lead facilitator of the peace process. As a consequence, third parties who were part of such mechanisms had limited opportunity to be involved in the intervention processes in isolation. Competency-based third-party recruitment, as part of these mechanisms, was another significant factor behind making the mandate-based interventions more coordinated. The conflicting parties initially called for expressions of interest among third parties who wanted to be part of these different intervention structures. Only those who demonstrated a high level of commitment to be part of such mechanisms were included. Consequently, the mandates bound third parties to coordinate with other third parties in intervening events.

5.7 Homogeneity and Third-Party Coordination

The homogeneity of some groups of third parties also contributed to promoting third-party coordination both in Nepal and the Philippines. One of the best examples of this is the coordination practices adopted by the EU countries close to them in Nepal. Coordination forums were utilized to share and verify information received from different sources, and respond to particular issue in a unified manner (Interview 2012).

Similar to Nepal, the homogeneity of the interveners has contributed to third-party coordination in the Philippines. One intriguing example of this is the structure and function of the ICG, which was facilitated by the homogeneity of the interveners. Due to its inclusion of both state and non-state actors, the ICG is generally considered to be a hybrid intervention mechanism. At the same time, it can also be interpreted as a homogeneous structure because the majority of its members are from Western countries and share similar social, political, and cultural values.⁸ The ICG is comprised of four nation states, namely, the UK, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Japan, and four Non-governmental organizations, namely, the Asia Foundation, the CHD, Conciliation Resources, and Muhammadiya. Five out of the eight ICG members represent the Western world. In addition, a shared goal by its members to maintain identity also means that the ICG can be described as a homogeneous group of third parties (Interview 2012). There are four major reasons to explain the occurrence of coordination among ICG members.

First, everybody within the ICG valued the diversity of the ICG (despite its homogeneity) and considered diversity as major strength in support of the peace process (Interview 2012). There was also respect for the different roles that actors played within the ICG, while at the same time they realized their interdependency in different intervention actions. Thus, an understanding of each other's strengths seems to have prevented them from competing with each other. Second, the ICG has functioned well because of a clear division of labor among the ICG members that helped everyone focus on their roles (Interview 2012). Third, members of the ICG agreed not to put pressure on the conflicting parties to come up with a peace agreement until and unless they were ready to do so. Rather, ICG members preferred to extend their support for the negotiation process and prevent it from failing (Interview 2012). Fourth, everyone has accepted the ICG's

⁸ Several participants interviewed in the field have viewed ICG is dominated by Western governments and organizations. Thus, I have also called it as homogeneous intervention structure.

diversity as strength, and has shared ideas and a central vision in support of the negotiation process (Interviews 2012).

Offsetting this finding, this research clearly demonstrates that there is a positive relationship between the homogeneity of the interveners and their coordination, and vice-versa. In addition, this research also revealed that coordination among heterogeneous interveners was only possible when they were forced to work together within formalized intervention structures mandated by the conflicting parties. The IMT of the Philippines is a highly relevant example in this regard. IMT incorporates not only local and external third parties, but also military and non-military personnel as interveners on the ground. IMT also incorporates members from both Western and Non-Western world and from local NGO to a multilateral institution, such as the EU. Thus I argue that, despite the dominance of homogeneous third-party coordination in intervention processes, the heterogeneous coordination of third parties can also take place in the presence of formalized intervention structures mandated by the conflicting parties. However, a careful selection of third parties, absence of powerful third parties, sense of interdependence among the associates are found to be quite crucial to make the formalized intervention structures contributory to the success of the peace process.

6. Discussion

As mentioned previously, the existing literature has explained that third parties coordinate with each other mainly because of their mutual policy interests and a broader coincidence of interests and commitments in the peace process (Iji 2005). This research highly confirms that a broader coincidence of interests and commitments are crucial to the occurrence of third-party coordination. However, it has further revealed that the *readiness* of third parties is the first and foremost conditions for their coordination. Context, Policy, and Motive (CPM) are three major factors which makes third parties ready to coordinate.

6.1 Third-Party Coordination as a Contextual Process

This research has demonstrated that third-party coordination is a highly contextual process, thus, how it takes place in one context, does not mean that it takes place in similar form in other context. For example, the occurrence of third-party coordination in Nepal is often seen as ad hoc, informal, and improvised. It largely lacks institutionalized and decentralized forms of third-party coordination. In contrast, third-party intervention practices in the Philippines are found to be

quite diverse in different phases of conflict, such as informal third-party coordination was found among local third parties, and they were particularly seen after the major outbreaks of war in 2001. The institutionalized third-party coordination is particularly practiced in the later phase of GPH-MILF conflict while the domestic and unitary third-party interventions failed to stop war and also to keep the parties engage in the negotiation processes. And there was no formal local-external third-party coordination until the reestablishment of the IMT in 2009. Likewise, third-party coordination is seen as an impulsive and sporadic event, rather than a planned process in the case of Nepal. Whereas in the Philippines, it is found to be little more planned and institutionalized, particularly during the peace negotiations phase from 2009 onwards. The reasons to have different coordination practices in different conflicts are heavily influenced by context, policy, and motives factors. However, there are also a few common factors that affect the coordination processes in each conflict context. Table 1 summarizes some of the common as well as case specific contextual factors that contributed to the occurrence of third-party coordination.

Table 1: The Occurrence of Third-Party Coordination

Common Elements for the Occurrence of Third-Party Coordination in Nepal and the Philippines	Nepal Case Specific Conditions for Third-Party Coordination	Philippines Case Specific Conditions for Third-Party Coordination
- Escalation of violence	- Complex and contentious issues in the peace process	- Lengthy duration and repeated failure of negotiations
- Complex political environment	- Cost-benefit analysis	- Mandate-based formalized intervention structures
- Issues of international concern such as human rights	- Convergence interests and common goals of third parties	- Conflicting parties' interests and initiatives
- Clarity on intervention issues		
- Homogeneity of interveners		

6.2 Policy Interests and Third-Party Coordination

Policy interests are often foundational criteria for third-party coordination. The influence of policy factors in third-party coordination processes can be interpreted from two aspects: a) policy interests of conflicting parties to bring third parties together and b) convergence of policy interests of third parties to coordinate. Once the conflicting parties are interested in accepting third parties to intervene in the conflict, then they initiate to establish mandate-based formalized intervention structures, where a group of homogeneous or even heterogeneous third parties can

work together for fulfilling their mandates. Consequently, while a group of third parties realize that they have similar intervention goal, they often prepare to coordinate.

6.3 Notion of Motives and Third-Party Coordination

One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that coordination is often guided by the institutional or strategic interests of third parties, rather than a real motivation to coordinate with others. Coordination decisions of third parties often depends on the cost benefit analysis of their *incentive*, such as what it was seen in Nepal, and the failure of previous unitary intervention practices, such as what it had happened in the Philippines. In Nepal, many third parties entered the conflict with their own institutional interests; however they somehow converged during the time of intense crisis in late 2005 and early 2006. But active coordination among third parties did not continue after the signing of the peace accord in November 2006 because each third-party wanted to establish the supremacy of their particular conflict resolution model. Thus, there was a real difference in coordination behavior from one phase of the conflict to another. Similar examples can be seen in the Philippines. There was no evidence of a common forum or intervention coordination structure for many years after the eruption of the GPH-MILF conflict. However, following the formation of the IMT in early 2010, the local and external actors expressed an interest in working together under the auspices of the IMT. I argue that the decision by external and local third parties to join the IMT was purely based on their individual institutional interests. In part, it was to gain prestige, and in part it was to enhance their national and international profiles as peacemaking institutions. Consequently, regardless of different institutional orientations, cultural differences, and personality differences, they were forced to coordinate, as they were bound by the IMT's code of conduct.

The above-mentioned explanation suggests that, third parties, except during the intensive armed phase of conflict, do not proactively coordinate by themselves -rather they are often forced to coordinate through certain formalized intervention mechanism. Third parties, particularly the less powerful one and those that are new to the conflict resolution field, find that joining certain intervention structures strategically beneficial, as this gives them a direct access to the conflicting parties and establishes them as important actors in the peace process. Likewise, third parties who have no previous experience in working under certain intervention structures, also find it useful to participate, mainly because they desire the experience in working in

collaboration with other actors. Interests shown by a sizable number of third parties to become the member of ICG and IMT justify this argument. Moreover, some third parties are interested in becoming the part of formalized intervention structure, mainly because of the demands or wishes of their local counterparts.

6.4 Summary of Discussion

How do we explain the different factors leading to the occurrence of third-party coordination as well as different practices of coordination? The existing peace and conflict literature has no clear answer to this. This paper has filled this gap with the identification of six major indicators that significantly contribute to the occurrence (or little occurrence) of third-party coordination. These indicators include, power and position of government and rebel groups, duration of conflict/negotiation, intensity of the conflict, characteristics and composition of third parties, issues of intervention, and the type of interventions. Table 2 below summarizes the role of such factors to the occurrence and nature of third-party coordination.

Table 2: Factors Contributing to the Occurrence (or little occurrence) of Third-Party Coordination

Factors	Significant Third-Party Coordination	Little Third-Party Coordination
Power and position of governments and rebel groups	-Strong government and strong rebel group (the Philippines)	Weak government and opportunist rebel group (Nepal)
Duration of conflict/ negotiation	Protracted conflict and protracted negotiations (the Philippines)	Short-term conflict and short-term negotiation (Nepal)
Intensity of the conflict	During the time of crisis and under the pressure of violence (both cases)	When the situation is relatively stable (both cases)
Characteristics and composition of third parties	- Limited involvement of global and regional powers (the Philippines) - Homogeneity of interveners (both cases) - Convergence of third-party interests (both cases)	- Multiplicity of major global and regional powers (Nepal) - Competing goals and interests (both cases) - Divergent of third-party interests (both cases)
Issues of intervention	- Issues that are the product of conflict such as the reduction of violence and human rights abuses (both cases)	- Issues that are the source of conflict (Both cases) - Post-agreement issues (Nepal)
Type of intervention	Mandated intervention (ICG and IMT in the Philippines)	Independent interventions (at high-level e.g. Role of India in Nepal)

In some situations third-party coordination has taken place spontaneously, but no coordination in some situations. For example, in both cases, this research finds a scenario that the coordination practices changes in different *phases* of conflict. No or little coordination takes place in the

beginning phase of conflict. A lot of coordination takes place in the intensive armed phase, and no or less coordination takes place in the post-agreement or political normalization phase. Along with the shared political interests (as argued in the literature), a number of contextual factors mentioned-above contribute to such shifts in coordination practices. However, not all these factors contribute to the occurrence of coordination in each armed conflict and peace process.

This research also indicates that, third parties, particularly the externals, are often concerned about or interested in collectively intervening in the immediate issues related to conflict, but not so much on structural issues that pushed the country towards a violent conflict. This also proves that third-party coordination is more driven towards dealing with symptoms rather than a preventive approach. I argue that such tendencies are seen in armed conflicts and peace processes because third-party interventions often (despite the prevalence of early warning mechanisms to avoid the possible escalation of conflict) take place when the situation began to deteriorate, and in such situation, their primary concern remains to protect civilians, and minimize the risk of genocide and protracted violence. Thus, third parties, in such context, focus their attention towards achieving short-term conflict resolution goals, such as the reduction of violence and human rights abuses, and the facilitation of the peace negotiations, as these actions are generally considered as within their global responsibilities, rather than addressing root causes of conflict. There are also significant levels of development and economic interventions carried out by third parties in conflict-affected countries to address the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequalities, and discriminations. However, they are often implemented as part of their own institutional development assistance framework and to the most extent for advancing policy interests of their own country and institution, and rarely such assistance is given under a common development cooperation framework designed by a group of third parties.⁹ As a result, many of these developmental efforts are suffered from unhealthy turf battles of donors, lack of wide coverage of intervention programs, and the lack of coordination.¹⁰ Development

⁹ Some countries have also developed provisions such as basket fund where many different donors put money into it and allow the national government to operate that fund under the set forth conditions of the donors. However, it is not widely practiced strategy for a coordinated action.

¹⁰ International donor community have adopted a number of declarations and resolutions such as Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action for aid effectiveness, and they fairly highlight the harmonization of donor countries to coordinate their efforts and simply procedures to avoid duplications. However, such practices are not translated effectively in actual practice. See more at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>.

interventions also suffer from corruption and the lack of governance in conflict-affected countries. Thus, they become less effective in addressing root causes before a conflict manifests itself.

7. Conclusions

This research clearly demonstrates that coordination does not take place just from the simple wishes of third parties or the conflicting parties; rather a *ripe moment* requires to the occurrence of coordination. It equally requires the readiness and realization of its needs by both supply (third parties) as well as demand (conflicting parties) sides. Likewise, formation of third-party intervention mechanism and a favorable political context is also quite crucial to the occurrence of coordination.

This research also demonstrates that third-party coordination is a very complex, strategic, and dynamic process which requires a convergence of multiple interests to occur. It is also a contingent process, which is often short lived, issue-based, and keeps on changing in each phase of the conflict. Coordination practices are also somewhat different from one conflict context to another. While third parties often do coordinate, their coordination should not be taken as a given. In fact, it is often inconsistent and sporadic. Often they only resort to coordination when it appears that their interventions cannot occur without it, when it appears that they cannot operate in isolation. From this perspective, coordination can appear almost as a last resort rather than as a generally desired objective.

Based on the finding that coordination often drops off in the post-agreement phase, it can be suggested that it is very important to pay special attention to third-party coordination in post-agreement or political normalization phase to ensure that those intervention efforts contribute to sustaining the peace process. Conflicting parties, particularly the government can play a crucial role for ensuring third-party coordination in this particular phase of conflict. In this regard, they first need to prioritize the core intervention agenda of post-agreement or political normalization phase, and based on that, they can call for third parties to provide necessary supports to address those agendas under the set forth intervention mandate. Likewise, the conflicting parties' commitments to only accept coordinated third-party support are crucial to the occurrence of third-party coordination.

Similarly, various kinds of intervention structures can also be useful in the pre-agreement phase. Conflicting parties should take a pro-active role in forming such intervention structures to provide an opportunity for heterogeneous groups of third parties to work together. However, conflicting parties should also pay particular attention to selecting appropriate third parties in each intervention structure, which should be primarily based on the needs of the peace process. The formation process can be the same as post-agreement intervention structure formation process. The ICG and IMT can be a good model in this regard. However, conflicting parties come up with more intervention structures, so it could formally involve more local and external third parties. For example, conflicting parties can form a Local Contact Group (LCG) to work as a watchdog of the peace process and provide necessary support which the ICG and the IMT type of structure are unable to perform due to their limited mandate in the peace process. LCG can incorporate a group of selected local third parties, who could bring local voice to the peace process and present it in front of peace panels. Existence of such structure could make them feel proud regarding local third parties' direct and measurable contribution to the peace process. Likewise, Peace Support Donor Group (PSGD) can be another structure with the responsibility of garnering financial support to the success of the peace process. This group can also be useful for launching an integrated peace and development support in conflict-affected regions.

It is also very important to make sure that third parties are coordinating not only on issues that are the product of conflict such as human rights protection and violence reduction, but also on structural issues that are the source of conflict. Third-party coordination on immediately exposed issues can minimize the cost of conflict and take a country from violence and bloodshed to negative peace. However, such coordination effort cannot be very effective for the sustainable solution of the conflict. Thus, future third-party coordination should go for longer-term and they should be directed towards addressing the structural issues related to conflict. For example, if grievance is one of the root causes of conflicts, then coordinated third-party support should be focused on addressing the issues around grievances, and this could be done by launching a long-term project with the joint initiatives of third parties. Likewise, most of the countries have formed a National Development Forum¹¹ and similar type of structures, where external donors play a significant role to shape the agendas of the forum. In this regard, both local and external

¹¹ For example, Nepal has a forum called Nepal Development Forum and the Philippines also has a Philippines Development Forum.

third parties can collectively pressure the government to consider conflict-created issues as one of the key priorities of such forums. Consequently, development interveners, while designing their development assistance framework for conflict-affected countries, can include the structural issues of conflict as one of their high priority of intervention for at least five to ten years after the termination of armed conflict.

Third-party coordination, despite its existence as sporadic conflict intervention strategy, has its potential to demonstrate the urgency of a particular issue in armed conflicts and peace processes. However, managing the competing goals and diverse motives of interveners is one of the most challenging tasks of third-party coordination process. Often third parties do not like to modify their intervention goals and policy interests until the domestic political environment and certain policy provisions force them to do so. The occurrence of coordination becomes even more difficult when there is multiplicity of global and regional powers involved. It gets even more challenging when there is an expectation of coordination among the powerful interveners, and between less powerful and powerful interveners.

Reference List

- Beber, Bernd. 2010. The (Non-)Efficacy of Multi-Party Mediation in Wars Since 1990. http://homepages.nyu.edu/~bb89/files/Beber_MultipartyMediation.pdf.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Richard Jackson. 2009. *Conflict resolution in the twenty-first century: principles, methods, and approaches*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Bhattarai, Rajan. 2005. *Geopolitics of Nepal and International Responses to Conflict Transformation: Friends for Peace*.
- Boehmelt, Tobias. 2010. Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact of Multi-Party Mediation. In *2010 ISA Conference, New Orleans, 17-20 February 2010 and the MPSA Annual Conference, Chicago, 22-25 April 2010*. New Orleans and Chicago.
- Böhmelt, Tobias. 2010. "The effectiveness of tracks of diplomacy strategies in third-party interventions." *Journal of Peace Research* no. 47 (2):167-178.
- Chataway, Cynthia J. 1998. "Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective." *Negotiation Journal* no. 14 (3):269-287.
- Chigas, Diana. 1997. "Unofficial Interventions with Official Actors: Parallel Negotiation Training in Violent Intrastate Conflicts." *International Negotiation* no. 2 (3):409-436.
- Crocker, Chester A. 2011. "Thoughts on the Conflict Management Field after 30 Years." *International Negotiation* no. 16 (1):1-10. doi: 10.1163/157180611x553845.
- Crocker, Chester A., Pamela R. Aall, and Fen Osler Hampson. 1999. *Herding cats: multiparty mediation in a complex world*. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall. 2001. "A Crowded Stage: Liabilities and Benefits of Multiparty Mediation." *International Studies Perspectives* no. 2 (1):51-67.

- Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall. 2002. "Two's Company But Is Three a Crowd? Some Hypothesis about Multiparty Mediation." In *Studies in international mediation*, edited by Jacob Bercovitch. Basingstoke, Hampshire [England]: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fisher, Ronald J. 2006. "Coordination between track two and track one diplomacy in successful cases of prenegotiation." *International Negotiation* no. 11 (1):65-89.
- Frazier, Derrick V., and William J. Dixon. 2006. "Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000." *International Interactions* no. 32 (4):385-408. doi: 10.1080/03050620601011057.
- Frieden, Jorg. 2012. "A Donor's Perspective on Aid and Conflict." In *Nepal in transition: from people's war to fragile peace*, edited by Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone and Suman Pradhan, 100-113. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Griffiths, Martin, and Teresa Whitfield. 2010. *Mediation Ten Years on: Challenges and Opportunities for Peacemaking*. Geneva: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
- Gurkaynak, C. Esra Cuhadar. 2007. "Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective: Comparing the Perceptions of Turkish and American Diplomats." *International Negotiation* no. 12 (1):57-82.
- Iji, Tetsuro. 2001. "Multiparty Mediation in Tajikistan: The 1997 Peace Agreement." *International Negotiation* no. 6 (3):357-385.
- Iji, Tetsuro. 2005. "Cooperation, Coordination and Complementarity in International Peacemaking: The Tajikistan Experience." *International Peacekeeping* no. 12 (2):189.
- Iji, Tetsuro, and Hideki Fuchinoue. 2009. "Toward a Better Understanding of Multiparty Mediation in International Relations." *Hiroshima Peace Science* no. 31:135-162.
- Jackson, Richard. 2005. "Internal War, International Mediation, and Non-Official Diplomacy: Lessons from Mozambique." *Journal of Conflict Studies* no. 25 (1).
- Jones, Bruce D. 2001. *The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars*. In *IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation*. New York.
- Kievelitz, Uwe, and Tara Polzer. 2002. *Nepal Country Study on Conflict Transformation and Peace Building*. Eschborn, Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).
- Kraft, Herman Joseph S. 2000. "The Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia." *Security Dialogue* no. 31 (3):343-356.
- Kriesberg Louis. 1996. "Coordinating intermediary peace efforts." *Negotiation Journal* no. 12 (4):341-352.
- Kriesberg, Louis. 1991. "Formal and Quasi-Mediators in International Disputes: An Exploratory Analysis." *Journal of Peace Research* no. 28 (1):19-27.
- Lindgren, Mathilda., Peter Wallensteen, and Helena Grusell. 2010. *Meeting the New Challenges to International Mediation: Report from an international symposium at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research*. Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
- Mahat, Ram Sharan. 2005. *In defence of democracy: dynamics and fault lines of Nepal's political economy*. Adroit Publishers.
- Nan, Susan Allen. 2003. *Intervention Coordination*.
http://crinfo.beyondintractability.org/essay/intervention_coordination/.
- Nan, Susan Allen, and Andrea Strimling. 2006. "Coordination in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding." *International Negotiation* no. 11 (1):1-6.
- Öberg, Magnus, Frida Möller, and Peter Wallensteen. 2009. "Early Conflict Prevention in Ethnic Crises, 1990—98." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* no. 26 (1):67-91. doi: 10.1177/0738894208097667.
- Paris, Roland. 2009. "Understanding the Coordination Problem in Postwar Statebuilding." In *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, edited by Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk. London: Routledge.

- Rawski, Frederick, and Mandira Sharma. 2012. "A Comprehensive Peace? Lessons from Human Rights Monitoring in Nepal." In *Nepal in transition: from people's war to fragile peace*, edited by Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone and Suman Pradhan, 175-200. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ricigliano, Robert. 2003. "Networks of Effective Action: Implementing an Integrated Approach to Peacebuilding." *Security Dialogue* no. 34 (4):445-462.
- Saurabh, Dr. 2010. Extension of UNMIN and Peace Process in Nepal. http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/vp_unmin.pdf.
- Sisk, Timothy D. 2002. Leveraging for Peace in Liberia: Options and Recommendations.
- Strimling, Andrea. 2006. "Stepping out of the tracks: Cooperation between official diplomats and private facilitators." *International Negotiation* no. 11 (1):91-127.
- Svensson, Isak. 2011. "Crowded with Conciliators: Exploring Multiparty Mediation in Civil Wars." *Peace and Policy* (16):63-71.
- Whitfield, Teresa. 2008. Orchestrating international action. <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/incentives/international-action.php>.
- Whitfield, Teresa. 2012. "Nepal's Masala Peacemaking." In *Nepal in transition: from people's war to fragile peace*, edited by Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone and Suman Pradhan, 155-174. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zartman, William I. 2004. "Sources and settlements of ethnic conflicts." In *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism*, edited by Andreas Wimmer et al, 141-159. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.